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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to answer the question of how the Chinese government’s policies 
towards the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim group living predominantly in the northwestern 
Chinese province Xinjiang, have influenced the political consolidation of the Uyghurs.  
Three aspects of this question are explored: Uyghur identity, interests, and Islamic 
mobilization.  First, have Chinese policies helped to strengthen or weaken Uyghur 
identity?  Second, how have Chinese policies shaped Uyghur interests?  Finally, is there 
any evidence of Islamic radicalization and mobilization of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, 
evaluated in the context of Marc Sageman’s theory on Islamic radicalization?  This thesis 
argues that the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang have increased Uyghur solidarity socially but 
not politically.  The Chinese policies have served to unintentionally unify the Uyghurs in 
opposition against a common adversary.  Nevertheless, the PRC’s overwhelming state 
capacity to repress Uyghur discontent has prevented the Uyghurs from achieving any 
significant form of political consolidation.  Finally, there is very little evidence of Uyghur 
Islamic radicalization and mobilization.  The situation in Xinjiang does not fit Sageman’s 
theory on Islamic radicalization.     
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the late 1980s, international attention to the Turkic Muslim group known as 
the Uyghurs has increased.  Interest in Uyghurs has expanded primarily for two 
reasons—reports of alleged human rights abuses against Uyghurs by the Chinese 
government, and acts of violence and alleged terrorism by Uyghurs against the Chinese 
government and Han citizens.  The last decade has witnessed a significant increase of 
Hans in the region of Xinjiang in the northwestern part of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and ethnic tensions have intensified as a direct result of this increase.  It is 
estimated that in the period of 1990 to 2000, between one to two million Han migrants 
moved into the region, contributing to the total 7.49 million Hans living in Xinjiang (40.6 
percent) in 2000.1  The Han population growth rate between 1990 and 2000 was 31.6 
percent—twice that of the ethnic population.2  Uyghurs argue that the changing 
demographics reveal the deliberate sinicization of Xinjiang by Chinese authorities.   
The contentious relationship between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government 
has been the focus of many works.  The purpose of this thesis, however, is to answer the 
question of how the Chinese government’s policies toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang have 
influenced the political consolidation of the Uyghurs.  Have the policies served to 
unintentionally unify the Uyghurs in opposition against a common adversary, or have 
they served to divide and fractionalize the population?  In examining the responses of 
Uyghurs to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule in Xinjiang, this thesis asks whether 
or not the policies have increased or decreased Uyghur political consolidation.   
Three inter-related aspects of political consolidation are examined: Uyghur 
identity, interests, and Islamic mobilization.  First, have Chinese policies helped to 
strengthen or weaken Uyghur identity?  Are the policies working to integrate Uyghurs 
into the greater Han society or have they served to further alienate the group?  Second, 
                                                 
1 Nicolas Becquelin, “Staged Development in Xinjiang,” The China Quarterly 178 (2004): 369. 
2 Becquelin, “Staged Development,” 369. 
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how have Chinese policies shaped Uyghur interests?  Do the policies give Uyghurs the 
tangible conditions to unite together and focus on common grievances?  Finally, are there 
any evidences of Islamic radicalization and mobilization of Uyghurs in Xinjiang?  Has 
the repressiveness of Chinese policies toward Uyghurs in any way influenced Uyghurs to 
seek terrorism as a response?  This thesis attempts to answer all these questions on 
Uyghur political consolidation.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The Chinese government holds the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR) to be of significant importance for economic, political, and security reasons.  
Xinjiang is China’s largest province, has the highest per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) of any province outside the eastern provinces, and holds the country’s principal oil 
reserves.3  In addition to oil, it also holds significant amounts of natural gas, gold, and 
uranium.4  Xinjiang also serves as an important economic passageway between China 
and Central Asia.  An oil pipeline between China and Kazakhstan supplies oil to the 
energy hungry state, part of Beijing’s plan to increase oil imports from Central Asia and 
decrease dependence on Middle Eastern oil.5   
The significant Uyghur population in the region poses one of the greatest 
challenges to the CCP’s goal of integrating Xinjiang into the rest of the country.  The 
Uyghurs’ discontent with Chinese rule brings the potential for escalating ethnic conflict 
and instability in the region.  The government has attempted to manage the Uyghur 
problem through hard and soft tactics, but has, for the most part, treated any sign of 
dissatisfaction with the CCP as potentially destabilizing and therefore unacceptable.  
Politically, Uyghur aspirations for autonomy or independence not only challenge the 
legitimacy of the regime, but also increase the risks of exacerbating other territorial 
sovereignty issues in Tibet and Taiwan. 
                                                 
3 S. Fredrick Starr, introduction to Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Fredrick Starr (New 
York: Central Asia-Caucus Institute, 2004), 3. 
4 Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 11.   
5 “China-Kazakhstan Pipeline Starts to Pump Oil,” Xinhua News, December 15, 2005, accessed March 
15, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/15/content_503709.htm. 
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As for security concerns, Xinjiang is bordered by eight countries—Mongolia, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.  A serious 
ethnic conflict could send a significant influx of refugees into neighboring countries, 
destabilizing bilateral relations.  There is also concern for increased terrorist activities 
stemming from Uyghur dissent.  The Chinese government has blamed numerous violent 
acts in Xinjiang on “terrorists” operating in and out of the state.  Terrorism is an obvious 
security issue in and of itself, but radical Islamic mobilization may also upset regional 
stability because of potential terrorist links to Central Asian neighbors. 
Assessing how the Chinese government’s policies have affected the Uyghur 
political consolidation is important because it can help us predict (1) the likelihood of the 
Uyghurs to have their grievances addressed by the government, (2) the likelihood of the 
Uyghur culture surviving under current PRC policies, and (3) the likelihood of Uyghur 
Islamic radicalization and mobilization.  The answer could reveal whether or not the 
government’s policies are working to integrate Xinjiang fully into the state, or working to 
effectively integrate the Uyghur population, or to effectively marginalize the Uyghur 
population with a significant demographic shift supported by Beijing’s hard power in the 
region. 
Each path is distinct, with a significant range of consequences.  If the policies 
have served to unify the Uyghurs, then political consolidation might be more effective in 
challenging the Chinese government and bringing about eventual change and ethnic 
stability for all sides.  However, increased political cohesiveness might also force the 
Chinese government to crack down even harder on the Uyghur population due to the high 
value the CCP has placed on integrating Xinjiang.  If Uyghurs have united through 
Islamic radicalization, then it can be expected that violence and further alienation will 
occur.  Alternately, if Chinese policies divide the Uyghurs (whether intentionally or not), 
the PRC will may successfully integrate Xinjiang by dividing and suppressing the 
Uyghur people in perpetuity.  
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C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES  
This thesis addresses the impact of Chinese policies on Uyghur political 
consolidation.  The combination of both Xinjiang’s importance to the Chinese 
government and the sizeable presence of an ethnic-minority group dissatisfied with Han 
Chinese rule make this a problem that will not go away easily.    
This thesis argues that Chinese policies have, in one way, increased the unity of 
the Uyghurs in direct response to the repression of Chinese rule.  Unfavorable state 
policies have united the Uyghurs against a common adversary.  The core of Chinese 
policies has been to change the Uyghurs (or in the government’s term, to “develop” 
them).  Uyghurs have responded in stressing even more so their distinction from the Han 
Chinese people and culture.  However, despite this improved sense of belonging to a 
greater Uyghur community, actual steps toward significant political consolidation are still 
lacking due to tremendous challenges imposed by the Chinese government.  After the 
series of demonstrations, protests, and riots in the 1990s, attempts toward political 
consolidation have been effectively squashed by the repressiveness of the Chinese 
regime.  The PRC’s state capacity is overwhelmingly superior to that of the Uyghur 
population.        
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Literature on Chinese Policies toward Uyghurs in Xinjiang  
The Chinese government’s policies toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang can be broken 
down into two unofficial broad categories.  The first consists of policies that are focused 
on the assimilation and development of the perceived “backwardness” of the Uyghur 
people.  The second category of policies can be considered the “hard” policies and many 
fall under the so-called “Strike Hard, Maximize Pressure” campaign launched by the 
Chinese government in 1996.  Chapter III examines these Chinese policies in greater 
details.   
The majority of the literature on the Chinese government’s policies toward the 
Uyghurs finds the policies repressive and in blatant violation of basic human rights, 
especially in regard to the Strike Hard campaign and crackdowns on Uyghur 
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demonstrations.  Much of this literature comes from researchers who have conducted 
fieldwork in Xinjiang, such as James Millward, Dru Gladney, Gardner Bovingdon, and 
Justin Rudelson.  Additionally, reports from Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and testimonials from Uyghur 
expatriates provided by transnational Uyghur organizations, also contribute to this field.   
Assimilation policies such as restricting the use of Uyghur and controlling 
education are viewed negatively by NGOs and Uyghur transnational organizations.  In 
the early 2000s, the Chinese government changed its previous policy of a bilingual 
educational system and mandated Mandarin study be incorporated in all primary level 
education.6  The primary concern with this policy shift is the loss of Uyghur authority to 
determine the language of instruction for their children, a right established in the PRC’s 
Constitution and the PRC’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.7  Some Uyghurs 
apprehensively view the language and education policy changes as a direct challenge to 
the safeguarding of Uyghur culture and identity.8  According to the Uyghur Human 
Rights Project of the diaspora group Uyghur American Association (UAA), the PRC 
language policy is like a “new Cultural Revolution for the Uyghurs” in which the Chinese 
government is “in the process of destroying the language.”9  It is important to note, 
however, that many urban Uyghurs, particularly intellectuals, tend to advocate that 
Uyghurs master the Mandarin language, arguing that only through the Mandarin language 
and secular education will the Uyghurs become better equipped to compete against the 
Hans.10   
                                                 
6 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, 104. 
7 Congressional Executive Commission on China, “The People's Republic of China Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law,” accessed March 13, 2012, 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=9507.  
8 Linda Benson, “Education and Social Mobility among Minority Populations in Xinjiang,” in 
Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Fredrick Starr (New York: Central Asia-Caucus Institute, 
2004), 198. 
9 Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Uyghur Language Under Attack: The Myth of ‘Bilingual’ Education 
in the People’s Republic of China,” accessed March 13, 2012, 
http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/UyghurLanguageUnderAttack.pdf. 
10 Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak. “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in 
Flux,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Fredrick Starr (New York: Central Asia-Caucus 
Institute, 2004), 310.   
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Also contentious is the content of the classroom curriculum, particularly the 
subject of Xinjiang’s history.  For example, in the 1990s, minority students were required 
to study and pass an examination on the Chinese government’s official version of 
Xinjiang’s history.  The PRC-approved version states that Xinjiang has been an integral 
part of China for the past two thousand years—a version of history that many Uyghurs do 
not agree with.        
The majority of the literature in this field also argues that economic development 
in the region has benefited Han migrants at the expense of the Uyghurs and other 
indigenous minorities (e.g. Kazakh, Tajik, and Uzbek).  Although the average standard of 
living has increased for most in the region, this growth is unequal.  Millward documents 
that higher-paying skilled and government positions are held disproportionately by Han 
Chinese.11  Becquelin argues that in southern Xinjiang, where the region is 
overwhelmingly non-Han, the average per capita income is half of that of Xinjiang as a 
whole.12  The influx of Han migrants has also been blamed for the lack of jobs for 
Uyghurs.  Millward provides evidence of Han construction site employers hiring Han 
migrants over locals due to the cultural gap and the lack of effort to bridge that gap.13 
 Additionally, most state funding for the “Develop the West” campaign is dedicated to 
building infrastructure related to “communications, transportation, large-scale industry, 
and energy development.”14  The impression of many Uyghurs is that they are “shut out” 
of these new jobs, especially in the energy sector.15 
In the post-September 11 world, and in the context of the U.S.-led “war against 
terrorism,” many argue that actions taken against dissident Uyghurs can now easily fall 
under the pretext of actions against terrorists.  In 2009, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs 
Committee published its hearing on the nature of Uyghur nationalism and questioned the 
validity of the PRC’s 2003 list of wanted “terrorists.”  The report points out that “human 
                                                 
11 James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 305. 
12 Becquelin, “Staged Development,” 372. 
13 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 305. 
14 Starr, Xinjiang, 10. 
15 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 305. 
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rights and Uyghur groups have warned that, after the 9/11 attacks, the PRC shifted to use 
the international counterterrorism campaign to justify the PRC’s long-term cultural, 
religious, and political repression of Uyghurs both in and outside of China.”16  Gladney 
argues that “China makes little distinction between separatists, terrorists, and civil rights 
activists” and that it is important to note that “one person’s terrorist may be another’s 
freedom fighter.”17  In a 2002 article in the Washington Post, Liu Yaohua, vice director 
of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (PSB), was reported to have said, “Any Uyghur 
who advocated independence for Xinjiang was probably a terrorist.”18  Bovingdon argues 
that “government officials in Beijing and Ürümqi have, with very few exceptions, shown 
no tolerance for open protests by Uyghurs, whatever the motivation” and that “no matter 
what the issue, Uyghurs do not have a right to express their discontent openly.”19  He 
assesses that between 1980 and 1997, there have been only four concessions made on 
issues that had taken the people to the streets in demonstration.  In all other cases, instead 
of addressing Uyghur grievances, the government has responded to protestors’ demands 
“with either stony silence or even more restrictive policies.”20   
As stated earlier, the majority of the literature on the PRC’s policies toward the 
Uyghurs holds that these policies have been unfavorable to the Uyghurs.  The main 
challenger of this common viewpoint is, not surprisingly, the Chinese government.  The 
government argues that its policies do benefit the minorities in Xinjiang (and elsewhere 
in the PRC)—both socially and economically.  If one takes a cursory look at the state’s 
official Xinjiang news, one will find a large number of reports on improvements in the 
quality of life for the people, to include increases in incomes and the significant amount 
of capital the state is investing to build roads and other infrastructure in the region.   
                                                 
16 “Exploring the Nature of Uighur Nationalism: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?” House Foreign 
Affairs Committee accessed on March 7, 2012, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/kan061609.pdf. 
17 Dru Gladney, “Responses to Chinese Rule: Cooperation and Opposition,” in Xinjiang: China’s 
Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Fredrick Starr (New York: Central Asia-Caucus Institute, 2004), 375.  
18 Philip Pan, “In China’s West, Ethnic Strife Becomes ‘Terrorism’,” Washington Post, 15 July 2002, 
sec. A12, quoted in Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 131.   
19 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, 131. 
20 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, 128,129. 
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In regard to education policies, the government points to the increase in literacy in 
Chinese and state efforts to provide greater educational opportunities for Uyghurs and 
other ethnic minorities.  In its 2003 white paper, the PRC asserts that “huge amounts of 
funds” have been expended to improve the “extremely backward situation in education 
among the ethnic minorities.”21  The document goes on to state that by the end of 2001, 
“the enrollment rate of school-age children had reached 97.41% for primary schools and 
82.02% for junior middle schools.”22 Affirmative action policies grant lower minimum 
university admission scores for Uyghurs who graduate from Uyghur-language schools.23 
 The government argues that the push for Mandarin fluency is for the sake of the 
Uyghurs.  That is, Mandarin fluency would allow the Uyghurs to compete more 
effectively in the modern world.  Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan stated in 2002 
that the change in the language policy was needed because “the languages of the minority 
nationalities have very small capacities and do not contain many of the expressions in 
modern science and technology which makes education in these concepts impossible. 
 This is out of step with the twenty-first century.”24  
In regard to its hard policies against alleged separatists and terrorists, the Chinese 
government maintains that its actions are justified in order to maintain stability, ethnic 
harmony, and continued support for economic growth.  In a 2002 report, Chinese officials 
assert that “terrorist incidents have seriously jeopardized the lives and property of people 
of all ethnic groups as well as social stability in China, and even threatened the security 
and stability of related countries and regions.”25  The PRC maintains, however, that the 
majority of the people support the regime, and demonstrations and acts of violence are 
instigated only by a small group of unstable individuals.26  Official reports promulgated 
by the PRC often times disagree with other reports from NGOs, independent news 
                                                 
21 “History and Development of Xinjiang,” Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, accessed March 11, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/index.htm.  
22 “History and Development of Xinjiang.” 
23 Benson, “Education and Social Mobility,” 208. 
24 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 345. 
25 “East Turkistan Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” Office of the State Council, accessed 
March 16, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml. 
26 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, 84. 
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agencies, and Uyghur transnational groups.  Official numbers for the dead and injured 
following inter-ethnic violence are often lower in Chinese reports when compared to 
outside accounts.   
2. Literature on Uyghur Political Consolidation 
The literature on the political consolidation of the Uyghurs falls into two general 
categories.  The first is that the Uyghurs are not a politically consolidated group—they 
are divided in numerous ways and for various reasons face significant challenges to 
strengthening their political cohesion.  The second viewpoint is that the Uyghurs do 
indeed face challenges to political consolidation but they are nonetheless achieving some 
measures of political unity.   
Many researchers point out that the Uyghurs are not uniform in their demands.  
Some Uyghurs want greater autonomy for the region while others want full independence 
from the PRC.  Some focus on rectifying human rights abuses while others desire greater 
economic opportunities at improving their standard of living.  There has yet to be a 
political organization that is considered truly representative of the Uyghur people.  
Rudelson and Jankowiak argue that the responses of the Uyghurs are varied and 
divided—ranging from acculturation, to non-violent resistance, to violent opposition. As 
stated earlier, many urban Uyghurs are open to secular education and learning Mandarin.  
Rural Uyghurs, on the other hand, tend to resist assimilation.  Bovingdon shares the story 
of a college teacher from southern Xinjiang who reported that, “because Uyghur children 
in the south were taught from an early age to look down on Hans and to follow their 
parents in calling them Qitay [Chinese] and kapir [infidel], whole classes of students in 
the south simply refused to study Chinese.”27 
Some works examine the historical background and peoples of Xinjiang for clues 
to explain the challenges to Uyghur political consolidation.  For example, Rudelson and 
Jankowiak argue that the weakness of Uyghur identity lies with the artificiality of the 
modern Uyghur identity that we understand today.  They assert that a large part of the 
                                                 
27 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, 89. 
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Uyghur identity was developed in direct response to the Chinese rule of the region.28  The 
term “Uyghur” has been used to describe different peoples throughout history—from a 
Turkic nomadic group living in Mongolia, to a sedentary oasis group in the Turpan 
region of Xinjiang, to a primarily Buddhist elite living in the Turpan oasis.29  Prior to the 
PRC’s rule, allegiances had been primarily to the family, clan, and oasis, not to a 
collective “Uyghur” ethnic group.30  Starr points out that Xinjiang had never been one 
clearly defined region, with the Taklimakan Desert in the middle creating a significant 
separation between the northern and southern parts of Xinjiang.31  As a result, “each of 
Xinjiang’s major oases constituted a kind of microculture, self-governing on a day-to-day 
basis and with its own distinctive economic and social features.”32  Rudelson and 
Jankowiak argue that this distinction still exists, despite the fact that the majority of 
Uyghurs see themselves as sharing the same roots and a common history.  The diversity 
of these indigenous people, now all under the label of “Uyghur,” cannot be ignored.  The 
region’s place in history as part of the Silk Road has brought with it a colorful array of 
cultures from all over the world – India, Europe, the Middle East, and China.  Rudelson 
and Jankowiak argue that it is this weakness in the Uyghur identity that has produced 
such varied responses to Chinese policies in Xinjiang.  It is because of this weakness that 
the Uyghurs face such hurdles to achieving significant political consolidation.  
Overall, Bovingdon provides a slightly more positive scholarly analysis on 
Uyghur political consolidation.  He points out that while overt collection action has 
decreased significantly since 2001 with harsh government crackdowns, there still exists a 
quieter form of resistance he calls “everyday resistance.”  This everyday resistance 
includes “grumbling, songs, jokes, satire, and political fantasy”—forms of resistance that 
may not make headlines but still serve an important political function.33  Bovingdon 
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argues that this type of resistance can “strengthen Uyghurs’ collective identity and 
resolve to remain distinct from the ‘Chinese nation’.”34  There is strong evidence on this 
resolve to preserve cultural distinction.  The number of intermarriages between Uyghurs 
and Hans is so low that it is “virtually nonexistent.”35  A footnote in Millward’s work 
provides an interesting anecdote to this point.  The wedding of two modern and educated 
Uyghurs who both worked for the Chinese government did not include a single Han 
invitee out of the 150 invited guests.36  Bovingdon concludes that everyday resistance “do 
not just substitute for politics—they are politics.”37     
Most Uyghur transnational organizations portray an encouraging perspective on 
Uyghur political consolidation, often times presenting the Uyghur people as a solid and 
cohesive group.  For example, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) states in their website 
that “records show that the Uyghurs have a history of more than 4000 years in East 
Turkestan” and “despite all the brutal and destructive campaigns by the Chinese 
government against their identity and existence, the Uyghurs and other indigenous people 
of East Turkestan refuse to be subjugated by China and are carrying on resistance torch, 
handed down to them by their ancestors, against Chinese occupation.”38  Both statements 
imply a long and common history shared by all the people who call themselves Uyghurs. 
 The statements also paint a picture of unity and action against a common adversary.  The 
East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) has on its website an even more blatant 
statement that, “the Turkic population of the Uyghuristan which possesses the same 
blood, language, tradition and religion were artificially divided into Uyghur, Khazak,  
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Kyrgiz, Uzbek and Tatar by the Russian Red Imperialists.”39  It also goes on to state, 
“...despite all the suffering and cultural genocide, the determination spirit of the people in 
Uyghuristan remains ever strong.”40    
The Chinese government’s stance on Uyghur political consolidation is mixed.  At 
one hand, as mentioned earlier, the government states that the overwhelming majority of 
Uyghurs are happy under the PRC rule.  This is in line with the government’s attempt to 
paint Xinjiang as a place where “the people of all ethnic groups are united” and the 
region is a “scene of prosperity.”41  Not only is the situation in Xinjiang “as a whole is 
good,” Chinese officials declare that “all the people in the country…have given 
wholehearted support to the Chinese government’s policies.”42  On the other hand, the 
Chinese government often link Uyghurs to terrorism.  Chinese officials assert that 
between 1990 and 2001, “East Turkistan” terrorist forces were responsible for over 200 
terrorist incidents, 162 deaths, and over 440 injuries.43  These forces, under the influence 
of “extremism, separatism and international terrorism,” have allegedly left many “blood-
soaked chapters in the historical annals.”44  Not only are these terrorists dangerous, they 
are also accused by the Chinese government of having close ties with international 
terrorists to include the “unstinting support” of Osama bin Laden while he was alive, 
primarily through financial and material aid and terrorist training.45  A good example of 
such inconsistencies is in 1999 when the XUAR government chairman, Ablät Abdurišit, 
told reporters during an interview that “since the start of the 1990s, if you count 
explosions, assassinations, and other terrorist activities, it comes to a few thousand 
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incidents.”46  However, he later stated in 2001 that Xinjiang was, “by no means...a place 
where violence and terrorist accidents take place very often.”47  
3. Challenges with the Literature 
A significant challenge to research for this thesis is the relative validity of 
divergent sources.  The veracity of the reports can be questionable, especially in the 
context of China’s heavy censorship.  The PRC has incentives to both downplay and 
exaggerate events.  Portrayals of stability help to encourage investments in the region.  
Portrayals of unrest help to justify increase in police funding and help to garner 
international support for the PRC’s battle against “terrorism.”48  This has often led to 
conflicting accounts from government officials, as an earlier example shows.  For similar 
reasons, Uyghur transnational organizations also have the incentive to paint a very grave 
picture to gain international support and, in some cases, legitimize their call for 
independence.  Even otherwise objective NGOs can produce flawed research and reports 
due to their dependence on testimonials by Uyghur dissidents, who can portray events in 
ways to favor their cause.49  Of course, even balanced reports by dissidents and others 
present challenges because it is often impossible to confirm their accounts.  
Another challenge is with the reliability of the data derived from interviews and 
surveys conducted by researchers in the field.  In the highly repressive environment in 
which freedom of speech does not exist and honesty can result in severe prison sentences, 
interviews and surveys can only reveal so much.  As Starr aptly puts it: “Strict controls 




                                                 
46 Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties,” The China Journal 44(2000): 84. 
47 “Governor Says Xinjiang Suffering Separatist Violence,” Agence France-Presse (March 1999), 
quoted in Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 115. 
48 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, 112–113. 
49 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, 119. 
 14
conduct the kind of field research, interviews, and surveys in Xinjiang that would be the 
norm for rigorous study elsewhere.”50  As such, data from such studies must be taken 
with the consideration of the above. 
Finally, Starr makes a good point on the intentionality of the Chinese government.  
He states: “Most analyses of the current predicament in Xinjiang, whether positive or 
negative, simply assume intentionality on the part of Beijing.  By doing so, they may 
miss an important element of the story, namely, the ways in which Beijing finds itself 
unexpectedly confronted by the unintended consequences of its own actions.”51  
Intentionality is incredibly challenging to decipher, but especially in the world of policies 
as officially stated intentions often times do not line up with the true purposes of actions 
and policies.  It is dangerous, however, to make the assumption that all actions and 
policies of the Chinese government are based on ‘evil’ intentions, even if that appears to 
be an easy conclusion.  To look at all policies through such a lens could inhibit the belief 
in change and hinder steps toward progress.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To gauge the relative consolidation of Uyghur political action, this thesis 
examines the responses of Uyghurs to Chinese government policies, looking specifically 
at how Chinese policies have influenced Uyghur identity, interests, and potential Islamic 
mobilization.  Uyghur responses to Chinese policies are examined primarily through 
published reports from researchers who have conducted surveys and interviews with 
Uyghurs.  Most of the research materials will come from works done by Dru Gladney, 
Justin Rudelson, James Millward, Gardner Bovingdon, and S. Fredrick Starr.  Other 
sources include reports from NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch.  Additionally, Chinese government white papers, Chinese news reports, and 
reports from Uyghur transnational organizations such as the WUC, the ETIC, and the 
UAA have been examined.  The possibility of Uyghur Islamic radicalization is evaluated 
in the context of Marc Sageman’s theory on Islamic radicalization.  Sageman argues that 
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there are four dynamics that all must be in play for radicalization to occur: moral outrage, 
a perception that there is a war against Islam, resonance with personal experiences, and 
the existence of networks to facilitate mobilization.  If Uyghur responses line up with 
these four factors, there is reason to believe that Islamic radicalization can or has 
occurred in Xinjiang.      
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into six parts.  Following this introduction and literature 
review, Chapter II provides a general overview and background on the Uyghur people 
and the Xinjiang region.  Chapter III examines the Chinese policies directed toward the 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  Chapter IV discusses the different responses the Uyghurs have had 
toward the Chinese policies.  Chapter V is an assessment of Uyghur political 
consolidation based on the examination of Uyghur identity, interests, and Islamic 
mobilization in response to Chinese policies.  This chapter attempts to explain why or 
why not the Uyghurs are experiencing significant political consolidation.  Chapter VI 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. WHO ARE THE UYGHURS? 
Today, the group of people known as the Uyghurs refers to the Turkic and 
Muslim people living predominantly in the northwestern part of the PRC.  According to 
the 2000 census, Uyghurs numbered 8.3 million, about 45.2 percent of the population in 
Xinjiang.52  According to some Uyghur sources such as the WUC and the UAA, the 
estimate is significantly higher at 15 to 20 million Uyghurs.53  Uyghurs are culturally 
distinct from ethnic Han Chinese.  To start with, Uyghurs look different than Hans, 
having physical features of both Europeans and East Asians.  Most Uyghurs are also 
Sunni Muslims, their ancestors having converted to Islam in the 9th century.  Uyghurs 
speak a Turkic language and eat halal food, most notably abstaining from pork, a favorite 
meat for many Hans.  The obvious cultural and social differences have been argued as a 
reason for continued ethnic conflict.      
The history and identity of the Uyghurs is a complicated issue, and in many ways, 
lie at the heart of the Uyghur and Chinese government conflict.  Both sides of the conflict 
have used history to serve its own political purposes.  Many Uyghurs contend that they 
are a distinct people group that have existed for at least four thousand years in the region 
and are hence the true indigenous people of the area.  According to the WUC: 
“Historically and culturally, East Turkestan is part of Central Asia, not of China. The 
people of East Turkestan are not Chinese; they are Turks of Central Asia.”54  Uyghur 
nationalists paint the picture of an independent past with the sovereignty of the Uyghur 
nation only relatively recently usurped by the Chinese.   
The Chinese government, on the other hand, contends that the region has been a 
part of “China” for just as long, and that ethnic Han Chinese were actually in the region 
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prior to the Uyghurs.55  Chinese officials assert that military and administrative 
jurisdiction over Xinjiang had been established since the Han Dynasty in 60 B.C.56  They 
conclude, therefore, that the Uyghurs are a part of China’s “great family of minzu 
[nationalities].”57    
Scholars have pointed out discrepancies in both Uyghur and Chinese government 
arguments.  Nevertheless, despite historical inaccuracies, each side has won over 
significant number of believers.  The subject of history in Xinjiang is not so much of an 
issue of validity as it is an issue of identity.  Among many other factors, the persistence 
of an alternative history that defines the Uyghurs as unique and distinct from the Chinese 
provides fuel for continued ethnic tensions.  The complexity and challenges of the 
Uyghur identity will be furthered explored in Chapter V.   
B. XINJIANG—THE “NEW FRONTIER” 
Xinjiang is an important place for both the Chinese government and the Uyghurs 
for various economic, political, and security reasons.  With about two-thirds of China’s 
oil imports coming from the Middle East and Africa, the importance of expanding energy 
sources prompts the PRC to place a high value on Xinjiang to decrease its vulnerability in 
energy security.58  Efforts to integrate the region into China have not been easy.  In 
addition to the significant size of disgruntled ethnic minorities, another tremendous 
challenge with the province is its harsh environmental conditions.   
The province of Xinjiang is the largest in China, with an area of over 1.6 million 
square kilometers—the size of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain combined—
but with only 1.5 percent of China’s population.59  The relatively sparse population 
speaks to the inhospitableness of the region.  The immense Taklamakan Desert makes up 
a significant portion of southern Xinjiang, acting as a sand-trap, burying towns and 
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suffocating travelers caught without shelter with seasonal sandstorms.60  The Tarim 
Basin in southern Xinjiang offer limited areas for agriculture, mainly through extensive 
irrigation.  A chain of oases run along the basin, persisting through spring-fed and 
mountain run-off water.  The Zungharian Basin in the northern part of the province 
consists of both desert and grasslands and also offers limited areas such as the fertile Ili 
valley for agriculture. 
Extensive attempts at controlling the environment, namely water exploitation, 
have come under the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), also known 
as the bingtuan.  The XPCC has rapidly cultivated and expanded arable land, but in the 
process has also created significant environmental damage.  Soil exhaustion, 
salinification, lowered water tables, and deforesting have resulted from the sizeable 
population growth and efforts to manipulate the land.  Fifty-three of the eighty-seven 
counties and municipal districts in Xinjiang have suffered desertification.61  One Chinese 
source on the environment and sustainable development in Xinjiang defined over 47 
percent of Xinjiang as “wasteland.”62            
Hans have settled predominantly in the central and northern regions of Xinjiang in 
developed cities such as Ürümqi.  In most urban areas Hans dominate the population—
Ürümqi, Karamay, and Changji all have more than 75 percent Han.63  Hans also hold the 
majority of the population in cities such as Altay, Hami, and Aksu.  In contrast, most 
Uyghurs live in the southern and predominantly rural regions of Xinjiang.  Uyghurs are 
the majority in cities such as Turpan, Kashgar, and Khotän—leading to the bitter joke 
that the “Uyghurs’ ‘autonomous region’ is to be found only in the wastes of Tarim.”64  
The obvious north-south divide has been further highlighted by the earlier mentioned 
differences in GDP per capita between the two regions.  The southern region from 
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Khotän to Kashgar is one of the poorest areas in all of China.65  Overall, areas with 
populations of Han majorities have higher GDP per capita than areas with Uyghur 
majorities, perhaps due to the disproportionate number of Hans holding favorable and 
higher paying “staff and worker” positions compared to non-Hans.66    
The lure of the “new frontier” has been too much for many Chinese to resist.  
Although Xinjiang boasts of the highest GDP per capita outside of the coastal provinces, 
it is due to its relative sparse population and oil production industry.67  Nevertheless, 
despite ethnic tensions and the harsh environment, migration to the province has 
persisted.  As the government continues in its attempt to control the land and its people, it 
remains to be seen how mounting environmental and demographic pressures will impact 
the region.   
                                                 
65 Toops, “Demography of Xinjiang,” 260. 
66 Calla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. 
Fredrick Starr (New York: Central Asia-Caucus Institute, 2004), 179. 
67 Toops, “Demography of Xinjiang,” 260. 
 21
III. CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S POLICIES TOWARD UYGHURS 
IN XINJIANG 
As stated in Chapter I, the Chinese government’s policies toward the Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang can be broken down into two unofficial broad categories.  The first consists of 
policies that are focused on the assimilation and social and economic development of 
Uyghurs.  Policies under this first category include regulations on minorities’ languages, 
affirmative action policies in education, and the “Develop the West” (xibu da kaifa) 
campaign aimed to increase the economic infrastructure in the region.  The second 
category consists of “hard” policies, many falling under the “Strike Hard, Maximize 
Pressure” campaign launched by the Chinese government in 1996.  The Strike Hard 
campaign consists of tough measures used to crack down on any activities deemed by the 
government as “separatist” or “terrorist” in nature.  This hard-hitting approach includes 
restrictions on civil liberties such as the freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, and freedom of religion.  It also includes arrests, detention, and at 
times executions of dissidents in the name of combating the “three evils” of “separatism, 
extremism and terrorism.” 
A. ASSIMILATION POLICIES 
1. Language Policies  
Beginning in the early 2000s, the Chinese government has taken increasing 
actions to raise the Mandarin literacy and fluency levels of minority students in Xinjiang.  
The primary reason given by officials has been to “meet the growing needs of economic 
and social development” in the region.68  Various measures have been implemented by 
the government toward this goal under the justification of ensuring “bilingual” education.  
At the preschool level, the government provides monetary incentives for minority parents 
to send their children to Chinese language schools instead of Uyghur language schools.  
In seven agricultural prefectures in Xinjiang, students attending Chinese language 
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preschools receive a subsidy of 1.5 yuan a day.69  The government has invested millions 
of RMB to establish Chinese language preschools and to train bilingual teachers.70  In 
addition, since 2002, the language of instruction at the university level has shifted to 
Mandarin.  In the past, two faculties had been maintained for instruction in both 
Mandarin and Uyghur.71          
2. “Develop the West” Campaign  
The “Develop the West” campaign, also known as the “Open up the West,” was 
initiated in 1999 by the PRC to improve the economic and social conditions of the less 
developed western regions of the country.  Xinjiang was to be top priority in this 
campaign, as stated by the chairman of Xinjiang in 2001.72  The campaign included the 
plan to invest 900 billion yuan over ten years in sizable projects such as the west to east 
natural gas pipeline, connecting Lunnan in the Tarim Basin to Shanghai, and the 
rehabilitation of the Tarim River.73  Other projects include developments in 
transportation, communication, agriculture, and energy expansion. 
The Chinese government has repeatedly expressed that economic development 
and improvement in the standard of living for minorities would improve ethnic relations 
in Xinjiang and decrease ethnic unrest.  The “Develop the West” campaign is touted by 
the PRC as part of the plan to resolve the backwardness of Uyghurs and other minorities.  
Chinese officials point to improvements in standards of living, increases in life 
expectancy, incomes, and educational levels of minorities as evidences that the Chinese 
government has been indispensable to the development of Xinjiang.  Related to this belief  
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is the significant migration of ethnic Hans into Xinjiang, argued by many as key in the 
development in Xinjiang in the past and necessary for the continued progress of the 
region. 
3. Migration of Han into Xinjiang 
According to official Chinese data, in 1941 Uyghurs made up 80 percent and 
Hans 5 percent of the population in Xinjiang.74  By 2000, Uyghurs made up only 45.2 
percent of the population and Hans had increased dramatically to 40.6 percent (7.49 
million people).75  This number for the Hans does not include the so-called “floating 
population” of non-registered migrant workers (estimated at hundreds of thousands or 
even millions), or the military and security personnel in Xinjiang.76  As stated earlier in 
the thesis, the Han population growth rate between 1990 and 2000 was 31.6 percent—
twice that of the ethnic minority population.77       
Deliberate Han migration to the Xinjiang region dates back to the Qing era.  
Initially, Han migration was mostly limited to the military and to the northern region.  In 
fact, from the period of 1760 to 1830, Chinese were not allowed to settle permanently in 
or bring their families to the Tarim Basin.78  Qing authorities did not allow or encouraged 
Chinese migration into the Tarim until after 1831.  After the Communist take-over in 
1949, the PRC government similarly resettled large numbers from the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), demobilized troops, cadres, workers, and students to the region.  
In 1954 the XPCC was established.  It was comprised mainly of demobilized PLA and 
Kuomintang (KMT) troops and political and criminal prisoners.  By 1955, the XPCC had 
brought in over 110,000 people to Xinjiang.79  Today the XPCC is estimated to have 2.48 
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million people.80  From the 1950s to the 1970s the PRC openly encouraged Han 
migration to Xinjiang and officially resettled millions of Hans to the region.       
Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has not explicitly encouraged nor 
mandated Han migration to Xinjiang.  The Chinese government has denied that the 
significant inflow of Han is a deliberate attempt in the sinicization of Xinjiang.  
Nevertheless, the “Develop the West” campaign has encouraged this migration and the 
government has continued to facilitate migrants to the region with the goal of rapid 
economic development in Xinjiang.81  Many disadvantaged Han seek greater 
opportunities in the west, with or without state incentives to do so.      
B. “STRIKE HARD, MAXIMIZE PRESSURE” CAMPAIGN 
As stated earlier in Chapter I, in 2002 the Chinese government released a report 
stating that between 1990 and 2001, “East Turkistan” terrorist forces were responsible for 
over 200 terrorist incidents, 162 deaths, and over 440 injuries.82  As a direct response to 
the ethnic turmoil and violence of the early 1990s, the “Strike Hard, Maximize Pressure” 
campaign was launched in 1996 to combat the “three evils” of “separatism, extremism 
and terrorism.”  The Chinese government vowed to crack down hard on terrorist forces 
that it claimed were responsible for explosions, assassinations, attacks on police and 
government institutions, poisonings and arson, establishing secret training bases and 
raising money to buy and manufacture arms and ammunition, plotting and organizing 
disturbances and riots, and creating an atmosphere of fear.83  Under the campaign, 
restrictions on civil liberties, arrests, detentions, and executions have occurred. 
1. Restrictions on Civil Liberties 
The PRC’s Constitution states in Article 35 that: “Citizens of the People's 
Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
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procession and of demonstration.”84  In reality, such liberties are severely limited in 
Xinjiang.  There are no real suitable ways for individuals to express discontent in 
Xinjiang, despite the fact that the PRC’s Constitution, under Article 41, states that 
citizens have the right to “criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or 
functionary.”85  The PRC, extremely cautious of any potential for political unrest, 
generally deals harshly with those involved in expressing political discontent.  
The Chinese government has stringent rules on both public demonstrations and 
private gatherings.  This was especially true in Xinjiang after the Baren uprising in 1990.  
Shortly after the incident, in which protestors attacked people and destroyed property, the 
government passed new set of rules requiring all demonstrations to be cleared in advance 
by the government.  A leader for the demonstration had to be identified and 
demonstrations were not to “threaten the unification of the estate, harm minzu solidarity, 
or compromise the interests of state, society or collective.”86  With regard to private 
gatherings, the Chinese government in 1995 banned the mäšräp, a traditional social 
gathering that was revived in 1994 by Uyghurs to offer support and accountability to 
Uyghurs fighting against alcoholism and drug abuse.  The mäšräp rapidly gained 
popularity and was not only successful at reducing alcohol and drug use but also in 
giving a sense of empowerment to the people.87  The Chinese government, in response, 
banned the mäšräp and, on multiple occasions, detained the leader of the movement, 
Abdulhelil.  The violent incident in Ghulja in 1997 was in part a response to this Chinese 
repressiveness.  Despite the positive impact such private gatherings have on Uyghur 
society, Chinese authorities do not approve of any organizations that it does not control.             
Literary works deemed subversive or inaccurate are also banned or even burned.  
Writers risk imprisonment and other forms of mistreatment.  For example, Turghun 
Almas’ 1989 work The Uyghurs was banned in 1991 and Almas placed under house 
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arrest.  The Uyghurs provides an alternative history to the official history promoted by 
the Chinese government.  Almas, a Uyghur nationalist, asserted in his work that Uyghurs 
had been a part of Xinjiang long before Han settled in the area.  Uyghurs were, therefore, 
the true indigenous people of the region.  In 2002 the Kashgar Daily newspaper 
published a list of 330 banned books that included Almas’ works.  Thousands of these 
banned works were publicly burned in Kashgar.88  Another example is of the writer 
Nurmuhämmät Yasin who had published the allegorical story titled “The Wild Pigeon” 
and was consequently sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison for “splittism.”89 
The media is also tightly controlled in Xinjiang.  The news is state controlled and 
the internet is heavily censored.  Websites containing any information on Uyghur 
nationalism are blocked.  Outside news coming in from abroad, provided through radio 
broadcasts from the BBC and the Voice of America (VOA), are frequently blocked by 
government jamming equipment.  In 2004 the Chinese government spent $40 million to 
purchase better jamming antennas.90  Even in the entertainment industry, the government 
is wary of particular Uyghur songs.  Some Uyghur artists face censorship during public 
performances or are prohibited outright to perform or make recordings.  In the early 
2000s, artists in Ürümqi were required to submit their lyrics to a censorship committee 
before recordings and performances, at times even directed to change their lyrics by the 
committee.91                       
2. Restrictions on Religious Activities 
The PRC’s Constitution states in Article 36 that “citizens of the People's Republic 
of China enjoy freedom of religious belief” and that “the state protects normal religious 
activities.”92  In a 2003 White Paper, the government stated that it allocates funds every 
year to maintain and repair mosques and that in 1999 alone 7.6 million yuan was 
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allocated to reconstruct three mosques in Xinjiang.93  The document goes on the state that 
the government protects the legal rights and interests of religious organizations and 
ensures religious texts and publications are available to believers of various faiths.   
During most of the 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the PRC did 
experience a relative expansion in religious freedoms and the relaxing of some 
restrictions on religious activities.  During this time new mosques were built and Uyghurs 
were allowed to travel abroad to Islamic countries.  However, since the late 1980s and 
especially after the ethnic uprisings in the 1990s, the Chinese government has tightened 
its control again on religious activities in Xinjiang.  Soon after the launch of the “Strike 
Hard” campaign, religious leaders were required to undergo “patriotic re-education,” 
restrictions were placed on the number of permits permitting people to go on hajj, and 
minors were prohibited to enter mosques or to participate in religious activities.94  
According to the 1999 Amnesty report on Xinjiang, many mosques and Koranic schools 
have been closed down, religious leaders deemed “subversive” by the government have 
been dismissed or arrested, and religious activities not considered “normal” stopped.95  In 
addition, party members and those working in government offices are forbidden to 
practice their faiths.  A 1996 document from the CCP Central Committee states that 
“Communist Party members and cadres are Marxist materialists and, therefore, should 
not be allowed to believe in and practice religion.”96  The 1999 Amnesty report also 
references a 1997 article in the Xinjiang Daily that states: “Those party members who 
firmly believe in religion and who refuse to change their ways after education should be 
given a certain time period to make corrections, be persuaded to withdraw from the party 
or dismissed from the party according to the seriousness of their case.”97              
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3. Arrests, Detention, and Executions of Dissidents 
The Chinese government denies that it holds any political prisoners.  In a report 
released in 2002, the government states that it “targets only a few core members and 
criminals who have schemed, directed and participated in violent terrorist incidents” and 
toward the rest of the people involved, who had been “hoodwinked” into participating, 
the Chinese government “adopts the attitude of educating and helping them, and 
welcomes them back to the truth path.”98  In the same document, the Chinese government 
denies that it targets any particular ethnic group or any particular religion but only targets 
criminals.   
In 1999, the National People’s Congress passed a law that identified “crimes 
against the state” and included “ethnic discrimination” and “stirring up anti-ethnic 
sentiment under such crimes.”99  Human rights groups have argued that this has allowed 
the Chinese government to arrest and imprison political activists.  Whether or not those 
detained by Chinese authorities are guilty or innocent of any crimes, the fact remains that 
there are many prisoners being held without trial and often times without knowing the 
charges against them.  Amnesty International has documented numerous cases of 
arbitrary detention and imprisonment, unfair trails, torture, and extra-judicial executions.  
Trials are often held behind closed doors and without defense lawyers.  In some cases, 
trials are held in front of hundreds or thousands of people at “public sentencing 
rallies.”100  Those who receive the death penalty during these public rallies are often 
executed immediately after the rallies.101  Amnesty International has recorded at least 
210 death sentences in Xinjiang between 1997 and 1999, the majority of those executed 
being Uyghurs.102            
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IV. UYGHUR RESPONSES 
Uyghur responses to the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang have varied, including 
assimilation, overt resistance, and covert resistance.  Overt resistance ranges from 
peaceful protests and demonstrations to violent riots and attacks on people and property.  
Covert resistance, also called “everyday” resistance by Bovingdon, is found mainly in 
private Uyghur settings and reveals more a mindset than actual actions against the 
government.  Uyghur responses from the diaspora are also important to explore, 
especially with regard to Uyghur transnational organizations.    
A. ASSIMILATION 
As stated in the literature review, many urban Uyghurs, particularly intellectuals, 
tend to advocate for Uyghurs to master the Mandarin language, arguing that only through 
the Mandarin language and secular education will the Uyghurs become better equipped to 
compete against the Hans.  Many Uyghur intellectuals believe that Uyghur progress must 
come through science and Western education.103  The adoption of the Mandarin 
language, however, brings challenges to maintaining Uyghur culture and identity and 
fluency in the mother tongue.  Rudelson and Jankowiak point out that Uyghurs who 
speak Mandarin tend to be more secular because their proficiency has allowed them 
greater exposure to Han secular life.104  In addition, anthropological research suggests 
that “Uyghurs educated in the Chinese-language schools do not attain the same degree of 
facility in their native languages as Uyghurs schooled in their own languages.”105  In 
response to these challenges, many Uyghur families send their sons to Mandarin-
language schools and their daughters to Uyghur-language schools in the hopes that the 
daughters will continue to pass on the Uyghur language onto to their children.106  This 
response reveals that although many Uyghurs believe that a certain degree of assimilation 
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is essential to improving the lot of their people, many still believe their culture to be 
unique and vitally important to preserve.        
B. OVERT RESISTANCE  
Overt resistance by Uyghurs has ranged from peaceful protests and 
demonstrations to violent riots and attacks on people and property.  In many 
circumstances, events starting off as peaceful protests or demonstrations would 
deteriorate into violence.  Data collected by Bovingdon on organized protests and violent 
events in Xinjiang, most of them documented in multiple sources, give us an idea of the 
frequency and nature of such overt events.  Since 1980 there have been the following 
number of incidents between Uyghurs and the Chinese government (or ethnic Hans in the 
region): 37 bombings, 15 successful assassinations, 3 attempted assassinations, 14 
murders (to include Hans and Uyghurs or other non-Hans who worked for the 
government), 2 stabbings, 2 acts of assault on Hans, 19 non-violent demonstrations and 
protests, 1 act of “insurgency” (attempt to establish independent East Turkistan 
Republic), 17 acts of arson, and 47 violent riots or clashes (to include gunfights, attacks 
on government personnel and property, and arrests ending up in violence).107 
Two notable violent incidents in the 1990s were the Baren uprising in April of 
1990 and the Ghulja uprising in February of 1997.  These two events greatly alarmed 
Chinese authorities, to which the effects are still felt today.  Accounts differ on the 
apparent causes and consequences of both events.  According to Chinese sources, the 
Baren uprising was the result of radical Islamic insurgents, assisted by the “East 
Turkistan Islamic Party” calling for a jihad against the Chinese government.108  Other 
reports propose that the armed uprising was fueled by Uyghurs’ objections to nuclear 
tests, restrictive family planning policies, and the perception of Han exploitation of 
Xinjiang’s resources.109  After surrounding government offices in Baren, protestors 
launched an armed assault, attacking and killing people and destroying property with 
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bombs and firearms.  Reports on the outcome of the Baren incident vary—international 
sources estimate over 60 killed but the official death toll is 22 (6 police, 1 cadre, and 15 
or 16 demonstrators or insurgents).110  Other sources estimate the death toll up to 3,000 
people.111                
The Ghulja incident was again blamed on Islamist terrorism by Chinese officials.  
However, other works by foreign scholars and Amnesty International revealed that the 
event was a response to the Chinese government’s attempts to do away with the mäšräp 
some few years earlier.112  As mentioned earlier in Chapter III, the Chinese government 
officially banned the mäšräp in 1995 and detained its leader Abdulhelil on multiple 
occasions.  The government had also gone as far as preventing the gathering of a youth 
soccer league organized by Abdulhelil by removing goalposts and taking the field for 
“military exercises,” and even brought in snipers during a peaceful, albeit “illegal,” 
march.113  The Chinese government’s harsh stance toward the mäšräp provoked 
Abdulhelil and others to plan the Ghulja protest, believed by some to have been a 
peaceful event that unfortunately escalated into violence during the crackdowns.114   
Again, accounts differ on the aftermath of the Ghulja incident, ranging from 300 
to 500 arrests on the first day, followed by extensive arbitrary arrests ranging from 3,000 
to 5,000 in the two weeks following the protest.115  There were also reports of abuses by 
soldiers and riot police, to include accounts of security forces hosing down 300 or 400 
protestors and residents with icy cold water.  These people were allegedly kept outside 
for hours in the freezing cold temperatures, resulting in cases of frostbite and 
amputations.116  The Chinese government’s accounts on Ghulja, interestingly enough, 
were inconsistent within themselves.  One Ghulja police spokesman denied that anything 
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had happened, while the autonomous regional government reported that same day that 
there were 10 deaths and 130 arrests.117       
Both the Baren and Ghulja incidents are interesting cases to examine because both 
conflicts had religious dimensions. The Baren uprising started in a mosque.  During the 
incident, some protestors called for a jihad, and many recited the shahada, an Islamic 
declaration that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God.118  
Soon after the confrontation, the Chinese government broadcasted alleged weapons and 
religious texts of the “insurgents,” to include a booklet that called for a jihad and the 
killing of “infidels.”119  During the Ghulja incident, protestors carried banners with 
religious messages and shouted religious slogans.120   
It is also important to note the swiftness with which these events escalated in size 
and intensity.  As Bovingdon points out, specific incidents can be recognized as 
“triggers” for such upheavals, but “the speed, violence, and scope of the popular response 
point to pent-up anger that had grown over a long period” and “while the precipitating 
events account for the timing of the protests, they cannot by themselves explain these 
protests.”121  Thus far, the Chinese government has chosen to respond to such incidents 
with repressive measures rather than attempt to address grievances.    
C. COVERT RESISTANCE—“EVERYDAY” RESISTANCE 
The literature review briefly discusses the covert resistance that Bovingdon calls 
“everyday resistance.”  Bovingdon argues that because of the repressiveness of the CCP’s 
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resistance includes grumbling, songs, jokes, satire, and political fantasy, all in the Uyghur 
language, which offers a degree of concealment since only a small percentage of Hans 
know the language.122   
The importance with everyday resistance is it helps to solidify Uyghur identity 
and keeps Uyghur nationalism alive.  Grumbling, songs, jokes, satire, and political 
fantasy all provide alternate perspectives to the official narrative imposed upon by the 
Chinese government.  Most importantly, everyday resistance helps to maintain and 
spread the belief that Uyghurs are distinctly different than and fundamentally 
incompatible with Hans.  Such ideas have very real consequences, even if they fail to 
restrain Chinese policies or produce obvious economic or political advancement.  Such 
ideas keep alive the hope and motivation to fight for independence or greater autonomy.  
And because of such hope, Bovingdon argues that “if the central state faltered or a new 
leader ushered in a period of political openness, change might be possible.”123  
Therefore, despite the decrease in overt resistance, one must be careful not to conclude 
that Uyghurs are either content or defeated.124    
D. DIASPORA RESISTANCE 
Uyghurs living outside of Xinjiang generally have far greater freedom to express 
opposition against the Chinese government.  Because of the repressiveness of the CCP 
rule, it is through the diaspora that “Uyghur oppositional voices continue to be heard.”125  
Notable Uyghur transnational organizations grew in numbers during the 1990s, and 
although the numbers have decreased in the last decade, many continue to grow today in 
influence by utilizing the internet.  These groups can be found in Central Asian countries 
such as Turkey but also in Europe and North America.  Uyghur transnational 
organizations advocate for a range of causes, from advancing human rights, promoting 
greater autonomy in the province, to demanding absolute independence of Xinjiang from 
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China.  The primary function for many of these groups is to provide information and 
enable networking for those interested in the Uyghur cause.  Many transnational 
organizations produce and distribute materials to Uyghurs in and out of China.  
It is important to note that access to these transnational organizations is mostly 
limited to the diaspora.  Because the internet is the primary means to garner support, 
transnational organizations face challenges with reaching Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  Many 
Uyghurs in China are actually unaware of such sites because of internet censorship, the 
high costs of internet access, and, in some cases, the general lack of technology.126  
Nevertheless, despite these challenges to so-called “cyber-separatism,” Uyghur 
transnational organizations have “helped shape the way the world views the region” by 
providing information to people beyond the borders of Xinjiang.127  In addition, these 
groups have helped to maintain Uyghur nationalism with their materials, “sustaining both 
Uyghurs’ sense of themselves as a distinct people and their belief in the possibility of 
independence in the future.”128  
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V. ASSESSING UYGHUR POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION – 
UNITED OR DIVIDED?   
What do Uyghur responses tell us about how the Chinese government’s policies 
have influenced their political consolidation?  First, have Chinese policies helped to 
strengthen or weaken Uyghur identity?  Are the policies working to integrate Uyghurs 
into the greater Han society or have they served to further alienate the group?  Second, 
how have Chinese policies shaped Uyghur interests?  Do the policies give Uyghurs the 
tangible conditions to unite together and focus on common grievances?  Finally, is there 
any evidence of Islamic radicalization and mobilization of Uyghurs in Xinjiang?  Has the 
repressiveness of Chinese policies towards Uyghurs in any way influenced Uyghurs to 
seek terrorism as a response? 
This thesis argues that the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang have increased Uyghur 
solidarity socially but not politically.  Uyghurs have increasingly embraced the belief in a 
common identity as a direct response to the Chinese government’s repressive policies.  
An “us” versus “them” mentality has developed as a result of real and perceived 
discrimination and persecution.  Uyghurs, despite their diversity, have increasingly 
adopted the belief that they are a part of a single community that is under threat from a 
common adversary.  Improvements in technology and infrastructure have also helped to 
close the geographical and cultural gaps between the disparate Uyghur groups.  
Nevertheless, actual political consolidation has been limited due to numerous reasons, to 
include the overwhelming Chinese state capacity to suppress dissent, and challenges in 
reaching consensus amongst the diverse transnational groups because of inherent 
differences.  Finally, this thesis argues that there are currently no indications of Islamic 
radicalization and mobilization of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. 
This chapter is broken down into three sections.  The first section looks at the 
influence Chinese policies have had on Uyghur identity.  The second section examines 




significant political consolidation.  The third section analyzes the possibility of Islamic 
radicalization and mobilization, evaluated in the context of Marc Sageman’s theory on 
Islamic radicalization.                       
A. THE UYGHUR IDENTITY: COMPLICATED BUT COMING 
TOGETHER   
As mentioned earlier, the region’s place in history as part of the Silk Road has 
brought with it cultures from all over the world – India, Europe, the Middle East, and 
China.  The diversity of these indigenous people cannot be ignored.    The term “Uyghur” 
has not always been used to describe the current group of people, but has been used to 
describe different peoples throughout history.  There were no references to Uyghurs in 
the accounts of travelers in the mid-16th century to the early 20th century – instead, people 
were described with oasis-identifying names such as Kashgarlik, Turpanlik, and 
Khotanlik.129  The geography of Xinjiang has posed physical challenges to the cohesion 
of the province.  Deserts and mountains have separated groups living in the region for 
generations, creating distinct local identities.130   
Two examples of such distinctions still found today are of the Uyghurs in 
Kashgar and the Uyghurs living in Ili.  Kashgar is the only place in Xinjiang where 
women wear head veils that completely cover their heads.  Kashgar also has the highest 
number of Koranic schools in Xinjiang and is arguably the most unstable region in the 
province for pan-Turkic and anti-Chinese sentiments.131  In contrast, Ililiks, or Uyghurs 
from the region of Ili, have perhaps the most secular outlooks and lifestyles compared to 
other Uyghurs.  Ililiks embrace Western clothing, keep up with global events, and see 
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Islamic schools.  The Chinese government has also reinforced the Ililiks’ sense of 
superiority – the Ili dialect is the standard used for the Uyghur language in education and 
for public broadcasts.132 
  Some scholars have argued that the artificial creation of the Uyghur identity 
came in the 1930s with the Soviet style policy of nationalist recognition.  This policy 
designated groups of “tremendous regional and linguistic diversity” in Xinjiang under the 
single label of “Uyghur.”133  About 95 percent of the indigenous peoples in Xinjiang 
became identified as Uyghurs.134  This policy included groups such as the Loplik and 
Dolan – groups that did not previously have any significant association or ties to the 
oasis-based Turkic Muslims who later became known as the Uyghurs.135  Some scholars 
have argued that the heart of the Uyghur identity still lies with the respective family, clan, 
and oasis, rather than with the whole designated ethnic group.136  Competing territorial 
allegiances, differences between religious factions, and linguistic dissimilarities are cited 
as some of the challenges to a unified Uyghur identity.137     
Nevertheless, despite the process of construction, many Uyghurs today accept the 
designation and do not question the origins of their identity.  The majority of Uyghurs 
agree that they are Uyghurs, even though that identity differs amongst different Uyghurs.  
In many ways, the development of the Uyghur identity was a direct response to both the 
growing Chinese nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and the 
growing presence of Han Chinese in the Xinjiang region.  Before the rise of modern 
nation-states, “ethnic identity was not as salient for social interaction and discourse.”138   
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As Starr states: “Whether or not they considered themselves Uyghurs prior to their 
encounters with the Han Chinese establishment in Xinjiang, many came to think of 
themselves as Uyghurs thereafter.”139   
The Chinese construction of the Uyghur people in the 1930s actually helped to 
solidify the Uyghur identity.  The fact that 90 percent of the people designated as 
Uyghurs live in Xinjiang is proof to many Uyghurs that the province belongs to them.140  
And while cultural differences still exists, the differences are less pronounced than they 
used to be.  The Chinese government’s role as the common adversary has brought a 
degree of social unity to the diverse Uyghur group.  Overt resistance has kept alive the 
desire of many Uyghurs for independence, and covert resistance have has encouraged 
Uyghurs to continue resisting assimilation. 
The heavy-handed approach of the PRC has at times produced unintended 
consequences that benefit the Uyghurs.  The Chinese government’s harsh and 
disproportionate responses to protests and demonstrations have sent the inadvertent 
message to Uyghurs that the threat is greater than it really is.  This misconception may 
actually help mobilize Uyghurs by encouraging them that Uyghur groups are more 
capable than really are or well-connected to other groups outside of Xinjiang.  For 
example, during the various incidents of 1997, PRC officials had responded with 
disproportionate number of security forces to send the message of “swift and brutal 
retaliation,” but instead sent a different message that the state was afraid.141  Similarly, 
PRC political materials that were supposed to warn Uyghur students against separatist 
movements instead inspired them, educating them of violent protests that occurred earlier 
in history, and convincing them of the “doggedness of Uyghur protestor[s]” and the 
“continuity of Uyghur dissatisfaction.”142   
Additionally, harsh crackdowns have, in some instances, actually served to 
increase the prominence of certain groups and individuals.  The government’s 
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persecution of Rabiyä Qadir (or Rebiya Kadeer) elevated her status to the international 
level as a champion for the Uyghur cause.  Similarly, the condemnation of Turghun 
Almas’ books launched him from obscurity into fame.143  The act of book-banning also 
conveys to many that the Chinese government is fearful of these texts, convincing many 
on the validity of such works.144  These unintended consequences of the PRC reveal that 
the Chinese government can promulgate propaganda but it cannot ultimately control the 
people’s interpretation of that propaganda.145      
In addition, improvements in technology and infrastructure have enabled greater 
communication between Uyghurs.  Technologies such as phones, radios, and televisions 
have allowed Uyghurs to engage one another across distances and have helped to give 
Uyghurs a greater sense of unity.  New roads and better transportation systems have 
given Uyghurs unprecedented ability to travel with relative ease, connecting previously 
isolated oasis communities to other Uyghurs.  Greater ease in travel has also allowed 
Uyghurs to interact with Muslims outside of Xinjiang.  This greater exposure has actually 
served to reinforce the Uyghurs’ belief in their uniqueness and strengthened ties between 
their fellow Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang.146  Perhaps most importantly, technologies such 
as tapes and radio broadcasts from abroad provide not only information but propagate 
Uyghur nationalist views.  Even with the Chinese government’s investment in jamming 
equipment to block radio signals from abroad, many Uyghurs responded by investing in 
shortwave radios to pull in signals through the jamming.147                 
B. THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION 
1. Repressiveness of the Chinese Government  
Violent confrontations have occurred periodically since the upheaval of the 
1990s, but the repressiveness of the Chinese regime has effectively crushed and 
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discouraged opposition since that time.  Since the late 1990s, documented “separatist” 
incidents in Xinjiang have decreased significantly.148  The Chinese government has 
adopted the strategy of specifically targeting leaders of protests and exacting severe 
sentences to serve as warnings to others.149  The strategy has been effective in deterring 
would-be-leaders.  As a researcher documented in an interview with dissatisfied workers, 
many of the workers claimed that they would “definitely participate” in a protest, but 
were “waiting” for someone to organize the protest.150  Public executions of protest 
leaders in Xinjiang also demonstrate the willingness of Chinese authorities to treat 
Xinjiang differently than the interior.151    
PRC officials have attributed the decrease in violence and protests over the last 
decade to economic growth in the region and Uyghur contentment with PRC rule.  But as 
Bovingdon convincingly argues: “viewed against the backdrop of increasing protests and 
violence in China proper and evidence of a pervasive wealth gap between Hans and 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the falling protest numbers indicate the success of the party-state’s 
actions to root out organizations and deter would-be protestors into quiescence – in short, 
not to resolve Uyghurs’ grievances but to deprive them of the sources and opportunities 
to articulate them publicly.”152  In interviews conducted in 2002, a reporter documented 
that Uyghurs were more afraid of the police than of terrorists.153   
  The decrease in violence since the 1990s has also been explained away by the 
PRC as a strategic response by “terrorists” to lessen international attention.  In the PRC’s 
2002 report on terrorism, the document states that “East Turkistan” forces, in order to 
“erase their terrorist marks and conceal their label as a terrorist organization,” have 
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“demanded that their members not publish radical remarks for the time being.”154  The 
report goes on further to state that “under the banner of protecting ‘human rights,’ 
‘religious freedom,’ and ‘the interests of ethnic minorities,’ they claim that the Chinese 
government ‘has taken the opportunity to crackdown on ethnic minorities’ in an attempt 
to mislead the public and deceive international opinion, and thus dodge the international 
crackdown on terrorism.”155  Such an un-falsifiable stance again reveals the 
unwillingness of the PRC to address grievances.            
2. Challenges Facing Transnational Organizations 
Uyghur transnational organizations face various challenges in the attempt to 
establish unity.  First, the Uyghur diaspora is spread throughout very different regions of 
the world, including Central Asia and Europe.  Consequently, these groups disagree on 
the primary objectives and interests of a united Uyghur front, on whether to use violent or 
peaceful means to achieve their goals, and argue over who should have leadership.  
Second, Chinese pressures on Central Asian states have limited the support of fellow 
Turkic-speaking peoples to the Uyghurs.  
Numerous attempts have been made to improve Uyghur political consolidation 
through transnational organizations.  In 1992, Uyghurs from the diaspora gathered in 
Istanbul to establish the East Turkestan World National Congress.  Serious 
disagreements, however, prevented any real progress.  In 1999 another conference was 
held, this time in Munich.  The plan was to establish a congress that would act as the 
single authoritative representative for all national and transnational groups.  Again, the 
groups disagreed on significant issues such as tactics.  Uyghurs from Western countries 
advocated for nonviolent methods, while Uyghurs from Central Asia argued that violence 
was the only realistic tactic left.156  Even the naming of the organization proved 
contentious.  Uyghurs from Central Asia favored a name that would include the name 
‘Uyghurstan’, as their experiences were with nationally defined states, while Uyghurs 
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from Western industrialized democracies favored a “pluralist, civically defined state.”157  
The compromise was the cumbersome name of ‘East Turkestan (Uyghurstan) National 
Congress’. 
The establishment of the World Uyghur Congress in 2004 is perhaps the most 
successful development thus far in the political consolidation of the Uyghurs.  The WUC 
has been much more effective than the previous two national congresses in reaching 
consensus and has been accepted by many in the diaspora as the representative of Uyghur 
interests.158  Nevertheless, despite the progress, no Uyghur transnational organization has 
yet been able to bring the Chinese government to the negotiating table.159      
From the 1950s to the 1980s, the Uyghur independence movement was centered 
in Turkey, where over two thousand Uyghur refugees had escaped to after the PLA’s 
‘liberation’ of Xinjiang.160  During the 1990s, the hope for many Uyghurs was that 
fellow Turkic-speaking Muslims in the new sovereign states in Central Asia would 
support the Uyghurs’ struggle for independence.  However, the combination of both the 
domestic politics of the Central Asian states and Beijing’s pressure has discouraged any 
support for the Uyghurs.  Nationalists in Central Asia depicted Uyghurs “not as 
beleaguered cousins but as dangerous aliens” and leaders blamed domestic problems on 
‘outsiders,’ generating xenophobia.161  In the last few decades, Beijing has placed 
increasing pressure on Central Asian states to discourage and undermine any potential for 
Uyghur organizations to consolidate support.  In exchange for economic aid from China, 
many Central Asian states promised not to provide assistance to Uyghur ‘separatists.’  In 
1995, Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement that dictated Kazakhstan security 
forces to monitor and report Uyghur activities to Beijing.162  The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) has also given the Chinese government another means to cooperate 
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with its neighbors to suppress Uyghur discontent.  Central Asian states, Pakistan, and 
Nepal have all extradited Uyghurs accused of separatism back to China where many were 
executed upon return.163  As a result of all these factors, the center of the Uyghur 
movement shifted from Central Asia to Western countries, where significantly fewer 
Uyghurs live.164      
3. Greater International Attention 
Despite the challenges transnational organizations face, they have been successful 
at providing information to the international community, specifically through the internet.  
As these groups become increasing cohesive and effective, international human rights 
groups have increasingly included Uyghurs in their agendas, as apparent in 1995 with the 
elected chair of the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organizations being a 
Uyghur.165     
The emergence of Rabiyä Qadir to the world stage has also given Uyghurs greater 
international attention.  At the present, Qadir is perhaps the most recognizable figure for 
the Uyghur cause.  She first gained fame in Xinjiang as the richest woman in the 
province.  She soon became a thorn to the government’s side with her increasingly vocal 
concerns for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  She attracted international attention when she was 
arrested in 1999 and sentenced to six years in prison for “leaking state secrets.”166  Upon 
release from prison in 2005 for medical reasons, she moved to the United States and 
continued to champion the Uyghur cause from there.  In a matter of months after she 
arrived to the United States, she became the head of the UAA.  By the end of 2006, she 
was voted to be the president of the WUC.  In 2005 and 2006 she was nominated for the 
Nobel Peace Prize.  Despite the Chinese government’s attempts to paint Qadir as a 
terrorist, her popularity and international standing has only grown in the last few years. 
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Although Qadir is not a leader in the same manner the Dalai Lama is to the 
Tibetans, mainly because she does not carry the religious significance or authority the 
Dalai Lama has as the reincarnate spiritual leader and the head of the Tibetan government 
in exile, she nevertheless has brought hope to many Uyghurs for an influential leader who 
can both unite the people and win international support.  Her symbolic leadership as the 
“mother of the Uyghurs” also generates a sense of commonality among Uyghurs.  In 
addition, as a female Muslim leader, Qadir has been able to combat some of the negative 
perceptions of Muslims as being oppressive to women.167  
C. JIHAD?  POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION IN THE FORM OF ISLAMIC 
RADICALIZATION AND MOBILIZATION 
Is there any evidence of Islamic radicalization and mobilization of Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang?  Has the repressiveness of Chinese policies towards Uyghurs in any way 
influenced Uyghurs to seek terrorism as a response?  Violence in Xinjiang in the last few 
decades has, without a doubt, increased international attention to the area.  But do these 
acts of violence indicate Islamic radicalization or are they non-religiously motivated 
reactions to a repressive regime?  This section of the thesis will evaluate the Uyghur 
responses to Chinese policies in the context of Marc Sageman’s theory on Islamic 
radicalization.  Sageman argues that there are four dynamics that all must be in play for 
radicalization to occur: moral outrage, a perception that there is a war against Islam, 
resonance with personal experiences, and the existence of networks to facilitate 
mobilization.  Are the Uyghurs experiencing the four dynamics of radicalization?  If 
Uyghur responses line up with these four factors, there is reason to believe that Islamic 
radicalization can or has occurred in Xinjiang. 
1. Moral Outage 
Sageman defines “moral outrage” as the “strong motivational effects of hearing 
about or watching the suffering of fellow Muslims.”168  This emotional response “has to 
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be brought about by human hands and seen as a major moral violation such as killing, 
injury, rape, or arrest – obvious physical injustice.”169  He gives the example of the 
infamous video of the killing of a twelve year old Palestinian boy, Mohamed al-Dura, 
caught in the crossfire between Palestinian and Israeli forces in Gaza in 2000.  The video 
provoked moral outrage because it was viewed as an unacceptable tragedy inflicted by 
Israelis.  Anger is at the heart of this motivating force, especially if there exits some kind 
of relationship between the victims and the witnesses.  Sageman argues that, “no amount 
of aid – rebuilding schools, digging new wells, outfitting hospitals – can change the 
calculus; moral violations count far more than attempts at restitution and forgiveness.”170  
Evidence in earlier chapters strongly suggests that most Uyghurs feel a sense of 
moral outrage against the Chinese government.  “Obvious physical injustice” can be used 
to describe the Chinese’s heavy handed approach to Uyghur discontent.  The Chinese 
government has been accused by numerous NGOs of gross human rights violations in the 
form of torture and arbitrary arrests and executions.  Scholars have also documented 
Uyghurs’ perception of and anger towards the PRC’s great moral violations. 
2. War against Islam 
Sageman argues that moral outrage alone is not sufficient for radicalization.  
Another element towards radicalization is the adoption of a “moral universe” that the 
moral outrage fits into.  Sageman finds that most Islamist terrorists adopt the belief that 
there is a war against Islam.  This world view not only makes sense of the immorality that 
they see and outrage that they feel, but also provides them the sense of purpose in 
providing answers on how to respond.  In this world view, “true” believers of the Islamic 
faith fight against the evil forces of this world (the degenerate West and or the Jews).  
Sageman argues that: “All global Islamist terrorist ideologies share a moral reductionism, 
which ascribes simple causes, and their implied remedies, to complex events.  This 
simplicity makes them easy to grasp, explain, and accept.  This vagueness of these ideas 
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about the nature of man, God, society, and history mixes politics and morality in a clear 
appeal for young Muslims to join the fight.”171  
Evidence suggests that Uyghurs are divided when it comes to determining 
whether or not there is a war against Islam.  On the one hand, the government’s 
crackdown on religious activities has without a doubt provoked anger and helped to rally 
protestors against the PRC.  Some Uyghurs feel that it is because they are Muslims that 
they are labeled as terrorists.  In 2002, the United States, in a controversial move, 
designed the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization.  Many 
Uyghurs point out the fact that that despite terrorist bombings and other violence in Tibet, 
the United States has yet to put a Tibetan separatist group on its terrorist organization 
list.172 
However, despite the common belief by Uyghurs that the Chinese government has 
been harsh in its control on religious activities, many Uyghurs do not believe that there is 
a war against Islam in Xinjiang.  Many do not see the crackdowns on religious activities 
as an attack on Islam specifically, but more as the government’s reaction to the fear that 
Islam may help to solidify ethnic nationalism.  As mentioned earlier, even with greater 
exposure to the outside Muslim community through travels on the hajj to Mecca, many 
Uyghurs actually “gained a greater sense of affinity with their own as one people than 
with other multi-ethnic members of the international Islamic community.”173  This 
disconnect between the Muslims in Xinjiang and the rest of the Muslim community is 
also reflected in the fact that Al Qaeda’s focus has always been on the Muslims in 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Chechnya – not China.174  Many Uyghur nationalists 
are also secularist, especially the intellectuals and urban dwellers who tend to advocate 
for greater education and Westernization to compete against the Chinese.  As Gladney 
asserts: “they would overthrow Chinese rule in Xinjiang in the name of Uyghur 
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sovereignty and human rights rather than in the name of religion.”175  The reasons 
Uyghur detainees gave for being in Afghanistan in 2001 were almost unanimously 
because of Chinese government persecution and the desire to fight for independence, not 
to wage a jihad.176    
 
3. Resonance with Personal Experiences 
Having anger towards real or perceived immorality and believing that there is a 
war against Islam are not enough to radicalize an individual.  Sageman argues that the 
jihadist viewpoint is internalized when the belief that there is a war against Islam also 
resonate with one’s everyday experiences.177  Muslims facing discrimination, especially 
in the diaspora, can easily read inequality as being connected to a global war against 
Muslims.  The “indisputable evidence in one’s own personal experience” serves as a 
powerful force to motivate young Muslims to join the fight.178   
For the Uyghurs who believe that there is war against Islam, their personal 
experiences would most likely resonate with this belief.  It would not be hard for a 
Uyghur to translate the government’s repressiveness, in particular regulations on 
religious activities, to confirm the belief that there is a war against Islam.  Uyghurs facing 
discrimination can and do also interpret such inequality in the context of religious 
persecution, in line with Sageman’s assessment on the Muslim diaspora living in Europe.  
The Baren and Ghulja incidents discussed earlier are two examples of clashes with 
religious connections.    
However, as stated in the above section, this thesis assesses that most Uyghurs do 
not see the conflict between Uyghurs and the Chinese government as a religious conflict.  
The fight is viewed more of a struggle for independence or greater autonomy.  Because of 
this, many Uyghurs view the battle as against colonialism, rather than against an “evil” 
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and “depraved” Western culture that other Muslims commonly declare they are 
combating.  The PRC does not fall so cleanly, or at all, into the characterization of a 
“depraved” Western society.    
4. Mobilized by Networks 
Sageman argues that the next step towards radicalization is to have people who 
are “further along the path of violence” to provide the guidance to these angry young 
Muslims.179  This interaction often occurs through face-to-face groups or through online 
groups.  According to Sageman, many individuals already have family members who are 
connected to terrorism, even before they have joined a terrorist organization.180  Many 
join along with friends, often time childhood friends, but also friends they made through 
extremist Muslim student associations or mosques.  Sageman asserts that “joining the 
global Islamist terrorism social movement was based to a great degree on friendship and 
kinship.”181 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang have an extremely limited capacity to network face-to-face.  
Beyond the “everyday resistance” described earlier in Chapter IV, it is incredibly 
challenging for Uyghurs to gather together in significant-sized groups without raising the 
suspicion of Chinese officials.  As demonstrated in the case of the Chinese government 
cracking down on the mäšräp, the PRC does not look favorably upon groups that it does 
not control.    
As for networking through online groups, the internet is heavily censored in 
Xinjiang, as it is in the rest of China.  As stated earlier, websites containing any 
information deemed by the government to be subversive are blocked, to include websites 
of Uyghur transnational organizations.  Access to computers is also limited in some areas 
of Xinjiang, due to the remoteness and lack of modernization in some parts of the region.  
For these reasons, it is hard to believe that Uyghurs could be mobilized through online 
groups as Sageman asserts many disgruntled young Muslims are doing in Europe.  As he 
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argues: “Without the Internet, a leaderless terrorist social movement would scatter all 
over the political space without any direction.  The Internet makes the existence of a 
leaderless jihad possible.”182  Uyghur expatriates involved in transnational organizations 
have obviously greater freedom for networking, particularly those living in democratic 
states, but nevertheless still face challenges in reaching Uyghurs back in Xinjiang.         
Despite Chinese officials’ repeated claims that Uyghur “terrorists” in Xinjiang are 
linked with Al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, there is little reliable 
evidence to support this claim.  For example, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRT) revealed that most of the 22 Uyghur detainees held in Guantanamo Bay had not 
heard of ETIM prior to being held in Guantanamo Bay and most had received little or no 
assistance from Al Qaeda or the Taliban.183  Five of these detainees were released in 
2006 and resettled in Albania, despite the PRC’s request for these men to be returned 
back to China.184  By 2008, the United States conceded that all of the Uyghur detainees 
were “no longer enemy combatants” and therefore in need of countries to accept them 
upon release from prison.185  Uyghur dissidents are not closely tied to Al Qaeda, as PRC 
officials claim. 
5. Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? 
How does the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang fit into Sageman’s theory on Islamic 
radicalization and terrorism?  This thesis assesses that the situation in Xinjiang does not 
fit into Sageman’s theory on radicalization.  The Uyghurs fulfill only one of the four 
dynamics of radicalization – moral outrage.  Most Uyghurs do not feel that there is a war 
against Islam.  Although their personal experiences may line up with the great moral 
injustices they witness, it is not in the context of a war against Islam.  The anger and 
discontent that they feel is against what they perceive to be a foreign power imposing its 
repressive colonial influence, not against a great immoral civilization that is waging war 
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against Islam.  That is not to say that religion does not play a part in the conflict in 
Xinjiang.  Many Uyghurs, secular or not, closely identify being a Muslim with being a 
Uyghur.  The faith is closely connected to the culture.  Therefore, repressive measures by 
the Chinese government are often viewed as a deliberate attempt to diminish or eliminate 
the Uyghur culture, to include its religious foundation.  Nevertheless, Uyghurs are not 
compelled to respond with a jihad against the PRC.  Lastly, Uyghurs are not mobilized by 
networks because the Chinese state, through various oppressive measures, simply does 
not allow this to happen.    
At this time, Uyghurs are not consolidated as terrorists or even as freedom 
fighters.  There is very little evidence of Islamic radicalization and mobilization in 
Xinjiang.  The repressiveness of Chinese policies towards Uyghurs has not, or at least not 
yet, influenced Uyghurs to rally together and seek terrorism as a response.  Although the 
Chinese government has blamed Xinjiang separatists for all the violent incidents in 1997 
and 1998, no Uyghur groups or individuals have taken credit for these acts.186  Very few 
of the confrontations since the 1990s can be definitively associated with Uyghur 
separatist or “terrorist” groups.  In addition, further examination of these incidents brings 
the question of how “terrorist” acts are defined, and whether regular criminal acts are 
being defined as acts of terrorism.  Lastly, there are no significant indications that there 
has been a call for a religious war against the Chinese – in fact, searches through the 
internet for calls on a jihad against the Chinese produces almost nothing.187  The appeal 
for taking a radicalized and militant Islamic response has not been noteworthy.    
  Millward makes the interesting observation that in earlier Chinese reports and 
writings, words such as “East Turkistan” and “terrorist” were not commonly found, and 
instead words such as “national separatist” and “enemy” were used to describe those 
involved in conflicts in Xinjiang.188  However, after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United 
States, the PRC began to extensively use terrorism-related language, as evident in the 
often referenced 2002 report “‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with 
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Impunity.”  The PRC received some international validation in its fight against global 
“terrorism” when the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, identified ETIM 
as a leading terrorist group in 2002.  Interestingly, none of the incidents in the 1990s were 
ever claimed by a group calling itself the ETIM and the first mention of ETIM was not 
until 2000.189  It appeared that few people had ever heard of the ETIM, to include the 
U.S. military, which in a 2001 report on Uyghur Muslim separatist not only did not 
mention the ETIM but also stated that there was “no single identifiable group” for the 
violent opposition in Xinjiang.190  These observations reveal the Chinese government’s 
attempts to take advantage of the “global war on terrorism” to suppress Uyghur 
dissidents. 
If the Chinese government continues to suppress the Uyghurs in the name of 
combating “separatism, extremism and terrorism,” is it possible that the PRC may be 
creating a self-fulfilling prophesy?  Is it possible that if a state keeps treating a people like 
violent criminals with a radical religious bent that these people might actually become 
so?  There are some concerns that Beijing’s harsh treatment of Uyghurs may eventually 
lead to radicalization.  In 2012, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF) stated in its annual report that: “China’s active repression of Uighur religion 
and culture may be counterproductive, leading to the very type of extremism Beijing’s 
policies are trying to forestall.”191  The USCIRF Chair, Dr. Katrina Lantos-Swett, also 
argued that the Chinese government’s religious persecution against Uyghurs has “led 
neither to stability nor security” but instead was “fueling anger and resentment” and may 
potentially “trigger precisely the extremism that Beijing is claiming to combat.”192      
Even though many Uyghurs do not believe that there is a war against Islam, it 
does not mean that they will not embrace such a view in the future.  Nor does it mean that 
another world view cannot be created and embraced.  There is already the belief amongst 
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some Uyghurs that the PRC is trying to commit cultural genocide on the Uyghurs.  In the 
case of Chechnya, the secular nationalistic struggle became radicalized for many reasons.  
Islam became a force for mobilizing and inspiring people to the nationalistic struggle, 
especially under the charismatic leadership of Shamil Basaev.193  Basaev’s success in the 
battle for Grozny attracted young disgruntled and unemployed Chechens to become 
fighters.194  There is the risk that if a future charismatic Uyghur leader emerges, he or she 
may utilize Islamic radicalization as a means to mobilize support in the fight for 
independence.  The continued repressive policies of the CCP certainly give Uyghurs 
tangible reasons to oppose the regime.  The appeal of radicalization may even be stronger 
if one believes that cultural genocide is happening.  In that case, self-determination 
becomes, above all else, the most important objective because without it, the perceived 
end is annihilation.  As Basaev so convincingly argues: “For me, it’s first and foremost a 
struggle for freedom.  If I’m not a free man, I can’t live in my faith.  I need to be a free 
man.  Freedom is primary.”195  Islamic radicalization is one possible approach to 
achieving this freedom.           
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of how the Chinese 
government’s policies towards the Uyghurs in Xinjiang have influenced the political 
consolidation of the Uyghurs.  Three aspects of this question were explored: Uyghur 
identity, interests, and Islamic mobilization.  First, have Chinese policies helped to 
strengthen or weaken Uyghur identity?  Are the policies working to integrate Uyghurs 
into the greater Han society or have they served to further alienate the group?  Second, 
how have Chinese policies shaped Uyghur interests?  Do the policies give Uyghurs the 
tangible conditions to unite together and focus on common grievances?  Finally, is there 
any evidence of Islamic radicalization and mobilization of Uyghurs in Xinjiang?  Has the 
repressiveness of Chinese policies towards Uyghurs in any way influenced Uyghurs to 
seek terrorism as a response?   
This thesis assesses that the Chinese policies have served to unintentionally unify 
the Uyghurs in opposition against a common adversary.  Despite the inherent challenges 
to consolidating Uyghur identity, Uyghurs have increasingly viewed themselves as part 
of the same family, history, and culture.  The heavy-handed approach of the PRC has 
produced unintended consequences of solidifying Uyghur identity, elevating opposition 
leaders, and encouraging continued resistance, albeit mainly in the form of covert 
“everyday resistance” due to the overwhelming repressiveness of the state.  With the core 
of Chinese policies being about changing the Uyghurs (or in the government’s term, to 
‘develop’ them), Uyghurs have responded in stressing even more so their distinction from 
the Han Chinese people and culture.  The Chinese polices in Xinjiang have not worked to 
integrate Uyghurs into Chinese society, but has only further alienated the group. 
Despite the Uyghur identity solidifying as a direct response to Chinese 
persecution, the PRC’s overwhelming state capacity to repress Uyghur discontent has 
prevented the Uyghurs from achieving any significant form of political consolidation.  
The Chinese government’s strategy of specifically targeting protest and demonstration 
leaders and exacting severe sentences has been effective in serving as warnings to others 
and deterring would-be leaders.  Stringent censorship of the internet and other means of 
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controlling information have presented significant challenges to any efforts to mobilize 
the people.  The government has also been effective in discouraging fellow Turkic 
speaking peoples in Central Asia from offering support to the Uyghurs.  Because of this, 
the heart of the transnational movement has shifted from Central Asia to the West, where 
significantly fewer Uyghurs live.  Transnational groups also face challenges in achieving 
unity because the Uyghur diaspora, spread over different regions of the world, disagree 
on objectives, interests, tactics, and on who should have leadership.  The split is generally 
between the diaspora living in Central Asian states, and the diaspora living in Western, 
democratized and industrialized states.   
Finally, there is very little evidence of Islamic radicalization and mobilization in 
Xinjiang.  The unfavorable Chinese policies towards Uyghurs have not, or at least not 
yet, influenced Uyghurs to rally together and seek terrorism as a response.  The situation 
in Xinjiang does not fit Sageman’s theory on Islamic radicalization.  The Uyghurs only 
fulfill one of the four dynamics Sageman argues is necessary for radicalization – moral 
outrage.  The strong terrorism rhetoric the PRC has used in describing Uyghur separatists 
can be attributed to the Chinese government’s efforts to take advantage of the “global war 
on terrorism” to suppress Uyghur dissidents. 
In conclusion, the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang have increased Uyghur solidarity 
socially but not politically.  Although there are occasional glimmers of hope for the 
Uyghurs found in the emergence of leaders such as Rabiyä Qadir, the overall situation in 
Xinjiang is not an optimistic one for the Uyghurs.  Current PRC policies have only served 
to exacerbate ethnic tensions.  If current PRC policies do not change, and Uyghurs 
become increasingly alienated, there is the potential for continued ethnic violence, 
perhaps on an even greater scale than previously seen.  If Uyghurs increasingly believe 
there is no hope of surviving what many already perceive to be cultural genocide, the 
appeal to fight may be too powerful for many Uyghurs to resist.  The combination of both 
Xinjiang’s importance to the Chinese government and the sizeable presence of an ethnic-
minority group dissatisfied with Han Chinese rule make this a problem that will not 
easily go away.    
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